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[T]he values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and
education of their children in their early and formative years have a
high place in our society.'
There can be no assumption that today's majority is "right" and the
Amish and others like them are "wrong." A way of life that is odd or
even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not
to be condemned because it is different.2
Recently the Portland exurb of Oregon City has been shaken by
what appears to be an ongoing horror in its midst. InJune [1998],
Oregon state medical examiner Larry Lewman stated suspicions
about... the 1,200 member Followers of Christ church. Over 10
years, he alleges, the faith-healing congregation's avoidance of doc-
* Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. B.., Northwestern
University, 1982; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1986. Thanks to Alfredo Gomez and
KelleyJohnson for their excellent research assistance.
1 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
2 Id. at 223-24.
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tors and hospitals may have cost the lives of 25 children, some
under excruciating circumstances.3
INTRODUCTION
Cases involving children and spiritual healing raise one of the
most pointed conflicts between the free exercise of religion and the
State's indisputable interest in protecting the health and welfare of its
citizens.4 Precedent and tradition support the rights of parents to di-
rect the religious upbringing of their children.5 The vast majority of
States have recognized these parental rights in statutory exemptions. 6
To varying degrees, these exemptions restrict the ability of a State to
mandate that faith healing believers treat their children with conven-
tional medical care. These exemptions also typically limit a State's
ability to bring criminal charges against a parent whose choice of spiri-
tual healing has caused a child to suffer harm.7
The long tradition of toleration toward spiritual healing may be
changing. Reports from Oregon City and elsewhere of children who
die unnecessary and painful deaths have horrified readers.8 During
3 David Van Biema, Faith or Healing? Why the Law Can't Do a Thing About the In-
fant-Mortality Rate of an Oregon Sect, TIME MAG., Aug. 31, 1998, at 68.
4 Spiritual healing is premised on a fundamentally different view of illness than
the views accepted by mainstream society. Conventional thought views most illness as
rooted in physical or biological causes. Spiritual healing views illness as resulting
from a lack of faith. A person may recover from an illness only by restoring his or her
faith through prayer. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 855 n.1 (Cal. 1988)
(describing the beliefs of faith healing practitioners); Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting
Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and the Effect of Faith Healing Exenqs
tions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 43, 44 n.2 (1994)
(same).
5 See infra Part II.
6 SeeJames G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child We.
fare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74
N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1354 (1996) (stating that forty-six states have adopted spiritual
healing exemptions); Rosato, supra note 4, at 51-57 nn.41-74 (citing spiritual healing
exemptions adopted in forty-six states).
7 See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1354.
8 See generally Lynne Bumpus-Hooper, Melbourne Boy Likely Suffered for Hours, OR.
1ANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 4, 1998, at B1 (discussing a two-year-old boy who died after bees
stung him more than 400 times, and reporting that the child's parents relied on spiri-
tual healing and did not seek conventional medical care); Donna Leinwand, Colorado
Parents Probed in Death of Newborn, USA TODAY, July 24, 2000, at 3A (discussing the
deaths of seven children whose parents belonged to the General Assembly Church of
the First Born, which treats illness with spiritual healing); Dan McFeely, Death Linked
to Religious Beliefs, INm~iANAoLIs NEws, Feb. 2, 1999, at Al (describing the death of a
twelve-year-old boy who died from pneumonia after he was treated through spiritual
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the 1990s, both South Dakota and Oregon repealed statutory exemp-
tions that formerly had been available to spiritual healing believers.9
Most recent legal scholarship is openly hostile to spiritual healing
exemptions.10
This Essay asserts that such attacks on spiritual healing often are
overbroad and insensitive to legitimate free exercise interests and pa-
rental rights. This Essay proposes that a State should intervene only
where a parent's refusal to seek conventional medical treatment po-
tentially may cause a child to suffer serious physical harm or illness.1
Further, the State should be required to show that conventional medi-
healing); Mark Sauer, Suffer the Little Children: Crusading Physidan Wants Medical Inter-
vention for 111 Youngsters I~ose Fate Is Left to Spiritual Healing, SN DIEGO Umo-TmB.,
June 22, 1999, at El (discussing a study by a San Diego doctor finding that of 172
deaths of children treated with spiritual healing, use of conventional medical care
almost certainly would have saved the lives of at least 140 of these children).
9 See Mark Haberman, Relgious Frezdom Shouldn't Bloc Children's Afedical Care,
IDAHo STATESMAN, Sept. 12, 1999, at 9B (noting that Oregon lamvakers repealed the
State's spiritual healing exemption in August 1999); Mark Larabee, Faith vs. Medicne:
Debating Accountability When Childs Illness Goes UntreateA CLEv. Ptt LN DE,%LR, Jan. 9,
1999, at 1F (noting that South Dakota repealed its spiritual healing exemption in
1990).
10 See, e.g., HenryJ. Abraham, Abraham, Isaac and the State: Faith-Healing and Legal
Intervention, 27 U. RICH. L Rxv. 951,986 (1993) (stating that spiritual healing exemp-
tions "promise a protection from liability that in practice neither protects nor accom-
modates anyone"); Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1477 (asserting that spiritual healing
exemptions violate the Equal Protection Clause and involve "a naked preference for
the interests of parents over the interests of children"); Ann MacLean Massie, The
Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care Decsionmahingfor Children: Suggestions for a New
Approach, 21 HAsrNGs CONsT. L.Q. 725, 775 (1994) (arguing that spiritual healing
exemptions amount "to an endorsement of the adults' religious practices, uhich vio-
lates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution"); Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the
Costs of Parental Free Exercise" Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Rligious Belief and a
Childs Right to Medical Treatment 18 PEP. L. Rrv,. 319, 352 (1991) (concluding that
legislatures should repeal spiritual healing exemptions); JanetJune Anderson, Note,
Capital Punishment of Kids: When Courts Permit Parents to Act on Their Religious Beliefs at
the Expense of Their Children's Lives, 46 VAND. L. RE%,. 755, 777 (1993) ("In essence,
courts must not interpret statutes so as to permit parents to sentence their children to
death.").
11 In discussing spiritual healing cases, this Essay assumes either that the ,affected
children are not old enough to understand the difference between spiritual healing
and conventional medical care or that the affected children agree with their parents'
choice of spiritual healing. These tvo fact patterns are typical in most spiritual heal-
ing cases involving children. See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1465-66 (noting that in most
cases, children either are incompetent to make informed treatment decisions or will
agree with a parent's choice of spiritual healing). This Essay does not address the
profoundly difficult questions raised where a parent wishes to rely on spiritual heal-
ing, but a child seeks treatment through conventional medical care-or -ice versa.
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cal treatment offers a fair probability of substantially improving the
child's health. In other cases, the State should respect the free exer-
cise rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their
children.
Part I of this Essay examines the long tradition that authorizes
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children, including
choices about spiritual healing or conventional medical treatment.
Part II considers why our legal system accepts a parent's choice of
spiritual healing over conventional medical treatment, even though
reliance on spiritual healing may result in a child suffering injury or
pain. This discussion notes that a parent's right to direct the upbring-
ing of his or her child receives support from two longstanding Ameri-
can principles: the religious choice principle and the family autonomy
principle.
Yet even these fundamental principles must yield when parental
choices threaten the State's survival. In the long run, a State's ability
to survive and flourish will be determined by the strength, ingenuity,
and character of its youngest citizens. Part III concludes that for the
State to preempt a parent's decision about a child's health care, the
State must demonstrate that exclusive reliance on spiritual healing po-
tentially may cause a child to suffer serious physical harm or illness.
Further, the State must show that conventional medical treatment of-
fers a fair probability of substantially improving the child's health.
Part IV evaluates arguments that spiritual healing exemptions vio-
late the Establishment Clause12 and the Equal Protection Clause 13 of
the United States Constitution. Part IV concludes that these constitu-
tional arguments are unconvincing.
States should adopt the approach to spiritual healing outlined in
this Essay as a prudential matter. According to the Supreme Court's
Free Exercise Clause 14 interpretation in Employment Division v. Smith,'5
the clause does not compel States to excuse religious believers from
generally applicable child custody laws or criminal statutes. In Smith,
Native American believers sought an exemption from an Oregon
criminal law that prohibited the possession of peyote.'5 The believers
used peyote as a sacrament in religious rituals. 17 The Smith Court re-
fused to exempt the Native Americans from "an across-the-board crim-
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
14 U.S. CONSr. amend. I (guaranteeing the free exercise of religion).
15 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
16 See id. at 874-76.
17 See id. at 874.
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inal prohibition on a particular form of conduct."I8 Although some
Supreme Court language might support a court-mandated exemption
in favor of parents relying on spiritual healing,19 Smith probably pre-
cludes a court-mandated exemption for parents charged with violat-
ing a generally applicable child welfare law or criminal statute.20
In holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not authorize
courts to mandate exemptions of believers from generally applicable
laws, the Smith Court endorsed leaving religious "accommodation to
the political process." 21 Citing several state statutes that exempted the
religious use of peyote from otherwise applicable criminal proscrip-
tions, the Smith Court approved statutory exemptions similar to the
spiritual healing statutes adopted in the vast majority of states. -2
The prudential approach advocated in this Essay is consistent
with the Smith Court's Free Exercise Clause interpretation. According
to Smith, the Free Exercise Clause does not require States to adopt
exemptions that immunize believers in spiritual healing from other-
wise applicable child welfare laws and criminal statutes.2 But, in cases
that do not involve the potential for serious physical harm or illness,
state legislators should adopt such spiritual healing exemptions.
I. PROTECTING PARENTAL CHOICE
Our society recognizes the right of parents to make lifestyle
choices for their children, including religious choices. Parents decide
whether their children will participate in religious rituals, whether
18 Id. at 884; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512-36 (1997) (inla.i-
dating a congressional statute adopted after the Smith decision, which had authorized
courts to mandate religious exemptions from generally applicable state Laws).
19 The Smith Court stated that the Free Exercise Clause might mandate exemp-
tions where believers relied on the clause "in conjunction with other constitutional
protections"--including parental rights. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 & n.1 (discussing W -
consin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). As discussed below, where parents seek to treat
their children through spiritual healing, these cases involve an intersection of free
exercise and parental rights. See infra Part II.
20 Scholars have responded to the Smith decision ith harsh criticism. Se e.g.,
Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Agai st Discrctionar, Accom-
modation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L RLv. 555, 609 (1991) ("Smith is . . . profoundly
wrong on both substantive and institutional grounds .... ."); Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Gin. L. RE." 1109, 1111 (1990)
(criticizing the Smith decision); see also David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the
Free Exercise Exemption: A CriticalAssessment, 75 B.U. L RE%. 241, 245 (1995) (asserting
that "[o]nce a legal system endorses legislative exemptions, the case against court-
mandated religious exemptions loses much of its force").
21 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
22 See id.
23 See id. at 878-90.
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these children will observe religious customs, and whether their chil-
dren will attend secular schools or religious schools.
A parent's right to direct the upbringing of her child is protected
by the United States Constitution. In Meyer v. Nebraska,24 the Supreme
Court invalidated a Nebraska statute, which mandated that schools
could not teach any foreign language. In holding that the Nebraska
law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
25
the Meyer Court asserted that this prohibition unconstitutionally inter-
fered with "the natural duty of the parent to give his children educa-
tion suitable to their station in life."26
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 the Supreme Court reviewed an Ore-
gon statute that required parents to send children between eight-
years-old and sixteen-years-old to a public school. The statute did not
allow parents to choose private schools. 28 Again relying on the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Court invalidated the Oregon statute. 29 The
Pierce Court asserted that the statute "unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control."30 In a broad endorsement of
parental rights, the Pierce Court continued: "The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations."31
A parent's right to determine the religious upbringing of his or
her children was recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder.32 In Yoder, Amish
parents refused to send their children to high school.33 The State of
Wisconsin alleged that the parents had violated a state law that re-
quired compulsory high school attendance. 34 The State brought a
successful criminal prosecution against the parents.35
The Yoder Court held that the State must exempt the Amish from
the compulsory school attendance law. 36 The Yoder Court read the
earlier Pierce decision as "a charter of the rights of parents to direct
24 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
25 U.S. CONgs. amend. XIV
26 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
27 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
28 See id. at 530-31.
29 See id. at 530-36.
30 Id at 534-35.
31 Id. at 535.
32 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
33 See id. at 207.
34 See id
35 See id. at 208-13.
36 See id. at 234-36.
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the religious upbringing of their children."37 The Yodermajority con-
cluded: "This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition."38
If a parent decides to treat his or her child's illness through spiri-
tual healing, such a choice seems to involve a finality not associated
with many other parental decisions. Upon becoming an adult, a child
may reject a parent's religious tradition and choose a different relig-
ion or no religion at all. However, if a child suffers a permanent in-
jury or death because a parent chooses spiritual healing over
conventional medical treatment, this harm cannot be undone.39
However, the Yoder case involved a similar sort of finality. In an
argument accepted by the Yoder majority, the Amish asserted that the
values of "self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social
life with other students" instilled by high school attendance would re-
duce the likelihood that Amish teenagers successfully could remain in
the Amish community.40 At the same time, exempting the Amish stu-
dents from high school would erect a formidable barrier to any possi-
bility that the students ultimately could succeed outside of the Amish
community.41
The Yoder decision thus involved a finality not dissimilar from de-
cisions about the medical treatment received by a child. If the Yoder
Court ruled in favor of the State, the Amish students would receive a
high school education, but the students might become estranged
from the Amish community. If the Court ruled in favor of the par-
ents, the Amish students would remain in the Amish community and
would lack the skills and experiences necessary to succeed outside of
Amish society. The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the Amish par-
ents, who believed that their children should remain in the Amish
community.42
37 Id. at 233.
38 Id. at 232.
39 See, eg., Massie, supra note 10, at 770-71 (asserting that a parent's decision to
rely on spiritual healing may have permanent adverse consequences for his or her
children).
40 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 211; see also id. at 218 (explaining that compulsory high
school attendance would substantially interfere "with the religious development of
the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish faith community
at the crucial adolescent stage of development").
41 In his dissenting opinion,Justice William 0. Douglas recognized the finality of
the Yoderdecision. See id. at 245 (DouglasJ., dissenting) ("If a parent keeps his child
out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be forever barred from
entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have today.").
42 See id. at 234-36.
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However, the Yoder majority was careful to note that the exemp-
tion of Amish students would have a limited impact on the state inter-
est in universal education. 43 Because the Amish accepted formal
schooling until their children reached high school, Wisconsin only
sought to require "an additional one or two years of formal high
school."44 The Yoder Court conceded that public education "ranks at
the very apex of the function of a State"45 and strongly suggested that
the result might be different if the Amish had asked the Court to ap-
prove a more significant interference with this state interest.46 In
cases where a parent's decisions seriously threatened "the physical or
mental health of the child,"47 the state interest in protecting a child's
health might outweigh claims of religious liberty and parental rights.
No Supreme Court case has held that the Free Exercise Clause
protects the right of parents to treat their children through spiritual
healing.48 State courts consistently have held that the Free Exercise
Clause does not prevent States from intervening when parents reject
conventional medical care for their children. 49
However, more than forty states have enacted statutes that pro-
tect a parent's right to rely on spiritual healing.50 Such statutes pro-
vide parents who rely on spiritual healing with a defense to some types
of criminal prosecution. Also, these statutes provide that the State typ-
ically cannot use a parent's reliance on spiritual healing against the
parent in a child custody proceeding.
43 See id. at 222-34.
44 Id. at 222.
45 Id at 213.
46 See id. at 234-36.
47 Id. at 230.
48 With the decision in Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Justices raised serious
doubts about whether the Court would find that a parent's right to treat his or her
child with spiritual healing is protected by the Free Exercise Clause. See supra text
accompanying notes 15-23 (discussing the Smith decision).
49 See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 869-71 (Cal. 1988) (holding
that the State could prosecute a parent for felony child endangerment and involun-
tary manslaughter where a child died of meningitis after receiving treatment through
prayer); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the
Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the State from ordering that a child must receive
conventional medical treatment, where the child suffered from a highly aggressive
form of cancer that required immediate treatment); State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159,
1163 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause did not bar a first-
degree manslaughter conviction, where a child treated With spiritual healing died of
diabetes).
50 See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1354 (stating that forty-six states have adopted spiri-
tual healing exemptions); Rosato, supra note 4, at 51-57 nn.41-74 (citing spiritual
healing exemptions adopted in forty-six states).
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The California statutory scheme is typical. A California statute
provides that the State typically cannot charge a parent with misde-
meanor child abuse where "a parent provides a minor with treatment
by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets
and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination."51
In addition, the State cannot typically use spiritual healing as the basis
for an adverse child custody determination. 5 2
Nonetheless, in spiritual healing cases, the California legislature
has provided that the State may take custody of the child "to protect
the child from suffering serious physical harm or illness."5 3 Similarly,
where the use of spiritual healing rather than conventional medical
care has caused a child to suffer serious physical harm, the statutory
exemption will not immunize a parent from felony child endanger-
ment charges.5 4 And where the State is able to prove that a child has
died because the child's parents relied exclusively on spiritual healing,
the State may charge the parents with homicide.r-
Some States provide parents who rely on spiritual healing with
broader protection than the California statutory scheme. For exam-
ple, a West Virginia statute explicitly provides that reliance on spiri-
tual healing immunizes a parent from murder charges.56 And in
Hermanson v. State,57 the Florida Supreme Court held that a more am-
biguous Florida statute also precluded a murder prosecution against
51 CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1999).
52 See Cal. VELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b) (West Supp. 2000).
53 Id.
54 See Walker, 763 P.2d at 866.
55 See id. In a number of other states, spiritual healing exemptions follow the
California approach. See, ag., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852(c) (West Supp. 2000)
(exempting parents who rely on spiritual healing from child endangerment prosecu-
tions, "provided that medical care shall be provided where permanent physical dam-
age could result to such child"); In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1982) (stating
that a Colorado statutory exemption for parents who rely on spiritual healing did not
apply where "a minor suffers from a life-threatening medical condition"); Hall v.
State, 493 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 1986) (stating that although an Indiana statute ex-
empted parents who rely on spiritual healing from child neglect prosecutions, the
exemption did not apply in a reckless homicide case); see also DanielJ. Kearne) Com-
ment, Parental Failure to Provide Child WIr Medical Assistance Based on Religious Beliefs
Causing Child's Death-Voluntary Manslaughter in Pennsylvania, 90 Dicm L RE%. 861,
885 (1986) (noting that under Pennsylvania law, parents "may treat their children
according to spiritual healing practices so long as the children's lives are not
endangered").
56 SeeW. VA. CODE § 61-8D-2(d) (1997).
57 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992).
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parents who had relied exclusively on spiritual healing to treat their
child.58
II. TiH INTERSECTION OF RELIGIOUS AND FAMILY TRADITONS
As the preceding Part demonstrates, a parent's right to direct the
religious upbringing of his or her child is constitutionally protected.
And in the vast majority of states, statutes explicitly protect a parent's
right to treat his or her children with spiritual healing, rather than
conventional medical treatment.59
But the cases and statutes cited in Part I of this Essay only beg the
question of why our legal system allows parents to treat their children
with spiritual healing and to forego conventional medical treatment.
Why do States allow parents to rely on spiritual healing when the deci-
sion to reject conventional medical treatment may cause a child to
suffer unnecessary pain and, in some cases, even may result in a
child's death?
Cases involving spiritual healing and children involve an intersec-
tion of two powerful traditions. The religious choice principle limits
the State's ability to intervene on questions of religious doctrine.6 0
The family autonomy principle recognizes the essential role played by
the family in the liberal state. 6 1 The following two Sections examine
each of these traditions.
A. The Religious Choice Principle
According to the Supreme Court, the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment 2 mandate government "neutrality" with respect to
religious beliefs. For example, in Epperson v. Arkansas,65 the Court in-
validated an Arkansas law that prohibited public school instructors
58 See id. at 776. A Florida statute provided that spiritual healing could not be a
basis for a finding of child abuse in a civil child custody case. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 415.503(f) (West 1998). In Hennanson, the State argued that this exemption pro-
vided spiritual healing practitioners with a defense only in child custody cases and
that the exemption did not apply in criminal cases. Hermanson, 604 So. 2d at 781-82.
The Florida Supreme Court held that the prosecution of the Hermanson defendants
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See id. at 776. The Hermanson court concluded that "the legislature has
failed to clearly indicate the point at which a parent's reliance on his or her religious
beliefs in the treatment of his or her children becomes criminal conduct." Id. at 782.
59 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
60 See infra Part II.A.
61 See infra Part II.B.
62 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
63 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968).
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from teaching the evolutionary account of man's origins. The Epper-
son Court asserted that this decision assured government neutrality
with respect to different religions.6 The Justices wrote that Govern-
ment "may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-
religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or relig-
ious theory against another."6
But in his book Foreordained Failure,66 Professor Steven D. Smith
recognizes that the Court's claim of neutrality cannot be squared with
Court decisions. As Professor Smith accurately observes: "Indeed, it
would not be much of an overstatement to say that modem legal dis-
course about religious freedom consists of judges and legal scholars
unblushingly proclaiming their 'neutrality' even as they reject both
the premises and the conclusions of their adversaries."67 In its re-
sounding rejection of the fundamentalist claim that public schools
must teach the creationist account of man's origins, the Epperson deci-
sion itself was not neutral.68
Further, an interpretation that sought to achieve neutrality be-
tween religion and non-religion would clash with the history of the
First Amendment. Members of new evangelical religions, such as the
Baptists and the Quakers, were some of the most vocal proponents of
the First Amendment religion clauses. 69 Given their own fervent be-
liefs on the importance of religious exercise, the argument that these
activists sought only to assure state neutrality with respect to religion is
not plausible.
As I have argued elsewhere, a more plausible historical account
would read the First Amendment as mandating the principle of relig-
ious choice.70 The religious choice principle captures a transforma-
tion in the American approach to religious dissenters, which occurred
around the time of the Revolutionary War. Prior to the American
64 See id. at 104.
65 Id.
66 STmvEN D. Sr-mH, FOREoRDINED FAILURE: THE QUEsr FOR A CoNsr-tmmo\.AL
PRINCIPLE OF RruGIous FREEDoM (1995).
67 Id. at 78.
68 See id. at 84 (asserting that in Epperson, the Court "had rejected in adfance the
fundamentalist position and background beliefs, with their emphasis on biblical liter-
alism as the avenue to truth").
69 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Fxer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1437 (1990) ("To determine the meaning of
the religion clauses, it is necessary to see them through the eyes of their proponents,
most of whom were members of the most fervent and evangelical denominations in
the nation.").
70 See David E. Steinberg, Gardening at NMght: Religion and Choice, 74 NoRE DA. t
L REV. 987, 1023 (1999) (book review).
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Revolution, the established Congregational and Anglican churches at-
tempted to stamp out the newer evangelical religions through fines,
imprisonment, banishment from a colony, and even executions. 71
But at about the time of the Revolutionary War, Americans re-
nounced the colonial practice of proscribing religious sects and pun-
ishing their adherents. 72 By the time of the Constitutional
Convention in 1789, most Americans agreed on the principle of relig-
ious choice, which was embodied in the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.73
The writings of philosopher John Locke and statesman James
Madison both explicitly endorsed the religious choice principle. In A
Letter Concerning Toleration,74 Locke wrote that the "liberty of con-
science is every man's natural right, equally belonging to dissenters,"
and that "nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion either
by law or force."75
James Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Relig-
ious Assessments76 remains one of the most eloquent expressions of the
religious choice principle. Madison wrote: "The Religion then of
every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every
man."77 Madison continued: "Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom
to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to
be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose
minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us."178
Although discussions of "neutrality" have dominated Supreme
Court decisions, rhetoric proscribing state interference in private re-
71 See id. at 1021-22 (summarizing the punishment of religious dissenters in colo-
nial America).
72 See, e.g., GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 55
(1987) (noting that by 1789, "[d]irect compelled subvention of a sect other than
one's own was an idea whose time had passed"); THoMASJ. CURRY, THE FIRST FRLE.
DOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 219
(1986) (stating that by 1789, "citizens had a right to practice the religions of their
choice, even the hated Catholicism, which had been proscribed in colonial
America").
73 See Steinberg, supra note 70, at 1015-23 (describing the historical origins of
the religious choice principle).
74 6 JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE WORKS OF JOHN LocKE 5
(Scientia Press, new ed. 1963) (1812).
75 Id. at 47-48.
76 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 183 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
77 Id. at 184.
78 Id. at 186.
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ligious choices has found its way into Court opinions." As early as
1963, the Court described the Free Exercise Clause as protecting "the
right of every person to freely choose his own course" with respect to
religious observance.80 In Muelkr v. Alen, 1 the Court upheld a state
tax deduction for tuition payments at sectarian and other prvate
schools, because "public funds become available only as a result of
numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age chil-
dren."8 2 And this past summer, the Court upheld a private school aid
program, because sectarian schools received the aid only as a result of
a parents' "private choices."83
Madison's non-judgmental approach in his lemorial and Remon-
strance is particularly appropriate with respect to medical treatment
choices. Despite extraordinary advances in medical diagnosis and
treatment, conventional medical science still lacks answers to a num-
ber of fundamental questions.
Although doctors often may identify genetic or environmental
factors that predispose individuals to develop certain diseases, medical
scientists often cannot definitively explain why some people fall ill and
others do not. Preventive treatments that typically are safe and pro-
duce laudatory results sometimes cause disastrous side effects. For ex-
ample, although the vaccine for whooping cough saves more than 400
lives each year, in rare cases the vaccine causes serious brain dam-
age.84 Medical science lacks effective treatments and cures for a num-
ber of debilitating and deadly diseases-such as aggressive forms of
cancer, Alzheimer's disease, and multiple sclerosis.
Given these serious limitations of medical science and the relig-
ious choice principle of the Free Exercise Clause, lawmakers should
not categorically preclude spiritual healing as an alternative. In par-
ticular, the State should not discount the psychic strength and com-
79 One of the most emphatic statements of this religious choice principle is the
quoted passage from Yoder that appears at the outset of this Essay. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972).
80 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
81 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
82 Id. at 399.
83 Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2541 (2000).
84 See Andrew R. Klein, Rethinking Aledical Monitoring, 64 BROWL L REx. 1, 28
(1998); see also Patricia C. Kuszler, Balancing the Barriers: Exploiting and Creating Incen-
tives to Promote Development of New Tuberculosis Treatments, 71 WASH. L RE%% 919, 962-63
(1996) (explaining that some patients injected with the suine flu vaccine developed
Guillain-Barre Syndrome, a dangerous paralysis that may result in death or perma-
nent disability); Charles J. Walsh et al., The Learned Intennediaiy Doctrine: The Correct
Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 RtrrcEm L Ruv. 821, 851 (1996) (noting the Sabin
polio vaccine sometimes will cause vaccine-induced polio).
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fort provided by spiritual healing in cases where doctors have
determined that a patient's condition is untreatable and terminal.8
B. The Family Autonomy Principle
Two characteristics of the liberal state are an emphasis on individ-
ualism and a refusal to entertain questions of morality. By emphasiz-
ing individualism, the liberal State encourages effort and
achievement.86 The liberal State rewards individuals based on their
personal accomplishments and refuses to reward those who do not
strive for success. The liberal State also rewards creativity. While radi-
cal proposals are risky and may never pay off, such proposals also hold
the promise of the greatest possible rewards. At least in theory, a per-
son's success in the liberal state is limited only by his drive and
imagination.
The refusal of the liberal state to entertain questions of morality
also is consistent with a society that seeks to maximize individual ac-
complishments.87 If the State takes any position on the "ultimate"
questions of morality and virtue, the State will exclude those individu-
als with differing views. The heretics will drop out of society and will
85 SeeAnne D. Lederman, Note, Understanding Faith: Wen Religious Parents Decline
Conventional Medical Treatment for Their Children, 45 CASE W. RE. L. REV. 891, 912
(1995) (stating that if religion sustains hope as believers face death, "its value is
immeasurable").
86 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLs, PoLmcAL LIBERALISM 190 (1993) (explaining that critics
often assert that liberalism is "arbitrarily biased in favor of one or another form of
individualism"); Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TuL. L.
REV. 955, 976 (1993) ("In political terms, the liberal individual stands alone.");James
W. Torke, What Price Belonging: An Essay on Groups, Community, and the Constitution, 24
IND. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (explaining that, in liberal philosophy, "the primary social
unit is the self-interested, self-defining person who pre-exists, philosophically as well
as ethically, society").
87 For assertions that government should not entertain questions of morality, see
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("[A]ffirmative sponsor-
ship of particular ethical, religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the
State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual
liberty and freedom of choice."); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) (holding that the Government cannot "prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion"); see also Stephen L.
Carter, The Separation of Church and Self, 46 SMU L. REv. 585, 588 (1992) (noting that,
although liberals assert "that it is wrong for the state to impose anybody's morality on
anybody else," no one actually believes this); Stephen A. Gardbaum, TWhy the Liberal
State Can Promote Moral Ideals After All 104 -Luv. L. REv. 1350, 1351 (1991) (stating
that contemporary characterizations of liberalism focus on "the neutrality of the state
toward moral ideas").
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no longer strive for contributions to the public good.83 And if the
State takes a position on a sensitive moral subject where vievs differ
significantly, the state position may result in open conflict.. The dis-
ruption caused by such a conflict will impede individual accomplish-
ments and social progress. The danger of state involvement on
questions of morality is reflected in the Supreme Court's "political di-
visiveness" concern, invoked when the Justices have reviewed church-
state relationships.8 9
As a result of this emphasis on individualism and de-emphasis on
questions of morality, the liberal state sometimes appears as a cold,
impersonal regime.90 With the emphasis on individualism in the lib-
eral state, personal relationships often suffer. As individuals seek to
better their lives by taking new jobs in distant cities, communities
deteriorate.91
In isolation, the liberal State does not provide individuals with
either the moral guidance or the personal connections necessary for
those individuals to live complete and happy lives-a condition neces-
sary for individual productivity. The liberal State relies on intermedi-
88 Cf MzcHuA J. SANDEL, L .I. AND THE Lrrs OF JusncE 196 (2d ed.
1998) (asserting that in modem democratic societies, "bracketing our moral and re-
ligious convictions is necessary if we are to secure social cooperation on the basis of
mutual respect").
89 See, eg., Lemon v. Kurtzan, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (holding state laws that
partially funded the salaries of teachers in sectarian prate elementary and secondary
schools violated the Establishment Clause, in part because of "the divisive political
potential of these state programs"); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252-53
(1982) (relying in part on the political divisiveness concern to in-alidate a Minnesota
law, which required that only some proselytizing religions must report contributions);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797 (1973) (inrali-
dating sectarian school aid programs, because such programs might generate "dhisive
political consequences"). But see David E. Steinberg, Alternathes to Entanglement, 80
Ky. LJ. 691, 714-23 (1991-92) (criticizing the political divisiveness doctrine, because
the doctrine contradicts First Amendment principles protecting religious speech and
proscribing religious discrimination).
90 See BENjSm N R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY. PARTICIPATORY POLrICS FOR A
NEW AGE 68 (1984); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AkMEr-QN CONSTITUTIONAL L\W § 15-20, at
1418 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that liberal individualism results in "alienation," with citi-
zens "isolated and made vulnerable"); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Betwern Two Worlds: The
Shift From Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Inju r, 33 UCLA L
RE-. 1473, 1534 (1986) (asserting that in the liberal state, "the self that remains is a
truncated, impoverished self").
91 See Torke, supra note 86, at 16-17 (stating that in the liberal state,
"[i]ndividual freedom is purchased largely by the unshackling of the person from
those institutions that largely governed, but also informed, the person's life-kin,
church, guild, locality, fealty, and class").
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ate institutions to fill these gaps.92 The family may be the most
important of these institutions.
93
In the American liberal state, the family has fulfilled a variety of
critical functions. First, the family is the primary source for interper-
sonal relationships. In a society that places little emphasis on personal
connections and shared tradition, the family provides the individual
with emotional support, interdependence, and a place in the world.114
Second, the family is the principal force that shapes the child into
an effective citizen.95 The liberal State requires that citizens must
maintain an attitude of tolerance toward others with differing views.90
However, such tolerance is likely only if an individual is capable of
love and mutual respect. As Professor Anne C. Dailey writes,
"[P]arents are understood to be ideally situated to provide the envi-
ronmental conditions necessary for successful psychological differenti-
92 See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 487 (1989) ("It is
now a familiar idea in political as well as social theory that people need communities,
and that social life is both natural and essential for human beings."); Marie A. Fall-
inger, Equality Versus the Right to Choose Associates: A Critique of Hannah Arendt's View of
the Supreme Courts Dilemma, 49 U. PiTt. L. REV. 143, 151-52 (1987) (discussing the
Supreme Court's suggestion that "private associations, in particular, may have intrin-
sic value, because they allow people emotional expression, the ability to share what is
intimate, not only thoughts but experiences and daily life").
93 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he tradi-
tion of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.").
94 See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTEss WoRLD: THE FANIwx BESIEcED 5
(1977) (describing a traditional view of the family "as a refuge from the highly com-
petitive and often brutal world of commerce and industry"); TRIBE, supra note 90,
§ 15-20, at 1418 (stating that the liberal State should facilitate "the emergence of rela-
tionships that meet the human need for closeness, trust, and love"); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When
the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 892 (1984) ("It is within
the family that parents provide for the child's security and intimacy, conditions neces-
sary for each child's physical, emotional, and moral development.").
95 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (holding that parental duties
include "the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship"); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEART: L'w AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 8 (1985) ("Though other institutions such as the com-
mon school and the church shared its duties, molding the nation's young into virtu-
ous republicans and competent burghers became more clearly the primary
responsibility of the family.").
96 SeeAnne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1835 (1995)
("[What liberalism requires of its citizens is a tolerant disposition, rational habits of
thought, and a willingness to engage in political discourse, what we may refer to as
'civic character.'").
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ation; the virtues of love, trust and empathy are commonly considered
beyond the capacity of state institutions to provide."9 7
Finally, families help to preserve the liberal state by insuring plu-
ralism and a diversity of opinion. The family and other intermediate
institutions constitute an important component in a system of checks
and balances.
From the early years of the republic, American political theory
has sought to check the development of powerful factions that might
seek to replace the tolerance of the liberal state with a required ortho-
doxy.98 Families and other diverse intermediate institutions have
helped to prevent the formation of powerful and intolerant factions.
Professor DavidJ. Herring writes: "[T]he family, through the produc-
tion of numerous diverse citizens, promotes social diversity and checks
factious behavior as expressed through the authority of the
majoritarian state."99
Opponents of spiritual healing exemptions would not permit
spiritual healing believers to make health care decisions for their chil-
dren. However, these critics are profoundly silent about who should
make these health care decisions.
A child may become ill at any time. If the State completely pre-
vented spiritual healing believers from making health care decisions
for their children, only two possibilities seem plausible. The State
might conclude that spiritual healing believers could not exercise cus-
tody over their children. Instead, another couple or the State would
raise the children. Alternatively, spiritual healing believers would re-
tain custody of their children, but the State would monitor the par-
ents' health care decisions on an almost constant basis. The radical
nature of both proposals is obvious.
Perhaps opponents of the state spiritual healing exemptions
would not divest spiritual healing believers of all authority for their
children's health care. Perhaps these critics believe that the State
should intervene only when the failure to provide conventional medi-
cal care will cause a child to suffer some serious injury. As discussed in
97 Id. at 1853; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALcr THE IMrOVERISHMENr OF
PoLmcAL DISCOURSE 74 (1991) ("A large collection of self-determining, self-sufficient
individuals cannot even be a society.").
98 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); see also David.J. Herring, Rear-
ranging the Family: Diversio, Pluralism, Social Tolerance and Child Custody Disputes. 5 S.
CAL. INTmisc. LJ. 205, 212-15 (1997) (discussing how families and other intermedi-
ate institutions preserve the pluralism sought byJames Madison and other early Amer-
ican statesmen).
99 Herring, supra note 98, at 215.
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Part III, most state spiritual healing exemptions already allow state in-
tervention in such circumstances.
III. LNrrs ON PARENTAL CHoICE: THE STATE'S RIGHT TO SURVIVAL
For all entities, the preeminent right is the right to survival. So it
is for the State. In the long run, the State's ability to survive will be
determined by the strength, ingenuity, and character of the State's
youngest citizens. The State possesses a preeminent interest in pro-
tecting children from serious and irreversible harm, which would pre-
vent these children from ultimately becoming productive citizens in a
democracy.100
The State's preeminent interest in insuring that children will be
capable participants in a democracy is recognized in a number of fa-
miliar laws. Child abuse laws allow the State to take a child away from
the child's biological parent in situations where continued residency
in a parent's home may result in serious harm to the child. 1° 1 Laws
requiring compulsory school attendance also help to insure that a
child is able to participate in a democracy.10 2
When faced with Free Exercise Clause challenges, the Supreme
Court has recognized the State's preeminent right to protect children
from serious and irreversible harm. In Prince v. Massachusetts,'0 3 Sarah
Prince was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses religion. Prince also
was the custodian and aunt of Betty M. Simmons, a nine-year-old
girl.10 4 On the evening of December 18, 1941, Simmons accompa-
nied Prince and helped Prince sell religious publications.' As a re-
100 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (noting that the State "has
an independent interest in the well-being of its youth").
101 See, e.g., Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together
Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 1045, 1087 (1996) ("In abuse and neglect cases, the Constitution ...
requires courts to balance carefully the need to protect children with the strong obli-
gation to protect family autonomy."); Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist
Analysis of the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
291, 322 (1992) ("In the context of parental neglect, states typically remove children
from their parents' custody only where there is evidence of child neglect or abuse by
the parents.").
102 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("There is no doubt as to the
power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.").
103 321 U.S. 158, 161 (1944).
104 See id. at 159.
105 See id. at 162-63.
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suit of these activities, a state court convicted Prince of violating
Massachusetts child labor laws.106
In affirming Sarah Prince's conviction, the Supreme Court held
that enforcement of the state child labor laws had not violated
Prince's Free Exercise Clause right to direct the religious upbringing
of Betty Simmons. 0 7 In recognizing the State's preeminent right to
survival, the Prince Court wrote: "A democratic society rests, for its con-
tinuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies."1 08 Given the "crip-
pling effects of child employment,"109 Massachusetts could enforce its
child labor laws by prosecuting Prince." 0
With respect to spiritual healing, state statutory exemptions also
recognize the State's right to survival. For example, a California stat-
ute provides that the State cannot prosecute a parent for the misde-
meanor of child endangerment, where the parent has treated a child's
illness through spiritual healing."' But in WaUier v. Superior Court12
the California Supreme Court concluded that this exemption from
misdemeanor child abuse charges did not prevent the State from
bringing felony child endangerment and involuntary manslaughter
charges against a parent.
Defendant Laurie Girouard Walker was a member of the Chris-
tian Science Church." 3 When Walker's four-year-old daughter
Shauntay fell ill with flu-like symptoms and a stiff neck, Walker and
other Christian Science Church members treated Shauntay with
prayer." 4 Although Shauntay's condition progressively worsened,
Walker did not seek conventional medical treatment for Shauntay." 5
Seventeen days after she originally fell ill, Shauntay Walker died of
acute meningitis." 6
106 See id. at 159, 163.
107 See id at 165-71.
108 Id. at 168.
109 Id.
110 See id. at 168-71; see alsoJacobson v. lassachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905)
(upholding the defendant's conviction for violating a compulsory smallpox vaccina-
tion law, because an individual's rights "under the pressure of great dangers, [may]
be subjected to such restraint... as the safety of the general public may demand").
111 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1999).
112 763 P.2d 852, 853 (Cal. 1988).
113 See id. at 855.
114 See id
115 See id.
116 See id
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Under these circumstances, the California Supreme Court held
that the State could bring felony criminal charges against Walker.1 17
The court noted that in child custody proceedings, treatment of a
child through spiritual healing usually is not a basis for depriving a
parent of custody.118 But even in spiritual healing cases, a court could
deprive a parent of custody where "necessary to protect the child from
suffering serious physical harm or illness.""19 The Walker court con-
cluded: "The expression of legislative intent is clear: when a child's
health is seriouslyjeopardized, the right of a parent to rely exclusively
on prayer must yield."' 20
In allowing the State to intervene in cases of "serious physical
harm or illness," the California law interpreted in Walker appears to
have struck the appropriate balance between a parent's right to guide
the religious upbringing of her children and the State's interest in
insuring its own survival.' 2' But in addition, the State should be able
to compel the use of conventional medical treatment only when medi-
cal treatment offers a fair probability of substantially improving a
child's health.
In Newmark v. Williams,'22 three-year-old Colin Newmark was
stricken with an aggressive and deadly form of pediatric cancer.
Colin's parents were Christian Scientists, who proposed to treat Colin
with spiritual healing. 123 The Delaware Child Protective Services
117 See id. at 873.
118 See id. at 856-58.
119 CAL. WEt. & INST. CODE § 300(b) (West Supp. 2000).
120 Walker, 763 P.2d at 866. The Walker court also rejected a defense argument
based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. See id. at 869-71. According to defense counsel, the clause required that
the State must exempt Walker from the felony child endangerment and involuntary
manslaughter charges. See id. However, the Walker court concluded that the state
interests in protecting children from serious injury outweighed any Free Exercise
Clause interest. See id. The court noted that a state will survive only if children ma-
ture into healthy, well-rounded citizens. See id. at 869. The Walker court concluded
that this state interest was "of unparalleled significance." Id.
121 See Barry Nobel, Religious Healing in the Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of Pa-
tients, Parents, and Healers, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rxv. 599, 668 (1993) (arguing that
although spiritual healing exemptions allow courts to order lifesaving treatment for
children, "courts should refrain from interfering with a family's integrity and religious
liberty in most other instances"); Rosato, supra note 4, at 117-18 (asserting that spiri-
tual healing exemptions should not apply to parents, where "serious bodily harm or
death" could result).
122 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991).
123 See id. at 1109-11.
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Agency sought to obtain temporary custody of Colin for the purpose
of treating the child wvith chemotherapy. 124
The Delaware Supreme Court denied the State's petition and
ruled in favor of the parents. 12 The State's medical expert admitted
that the chemotherapy treatment proposed by the State involved a
number of terrible side effects and that the treatment itself might kill
Colin Newmark.126 Even if the treatment did not kill Colin, the
State's medical expert estimated that after these highly invasive medi-
cal procedures, Colin would have "at best" a forty percent chance of
surviving his cancer.1 27
Based on this record, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that the State had not met the "heavy burden" that would justify state
intervention in the parent-child relationship. -12 8 In concluding that
Colin's best interests were served by permitting his parents to retain
custody and rely on spiritual healing, the Newniar court wrote: "Par-
ents must have the right at some point to reject medical treatment for
their child."129
IV. THE UNCONVINCING CONsTTLrroNAL CHALLENGES TO SPIRITUL.
HEALING Ex-EMrPTIONS
Most opponents of state spiritual healing exemptions simply ar-
gue that such statutes underestimate the importance of caring for
children with conventional medical treatment 130 However, two schol-
ars have developed more sophisticated arguments in opposition to
state spiritual healing exemptions. According to Professor Ann
MacLean Massie, the exemption statutes violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 31 Professor James G. Dwyer con-
tends that the exemption statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause
124 See id. at 1109-10.
125 See id at 1120-21.
126 See id. at 1119.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 1110.
129 Id. at 1120.
130 See, e.g., Ivy B. Dodes, Note, "Suffer the Little Children" Toward ajudiial Recogni-
tion of a Duiy of Reasonable Care Owed Children Iy Rigious Faith Heale 16 Horsrr,% L
REv. 165, 183 (1987) ("The judicial system has recognized the grave danger to chil-
dren which could ensue if defendant churches are permitted to opt out of a statutory
system designed to protect children. .. ."); Laura M. Plasdine, Comment, "In God lISI
Trust: When Parents Refuse Medical Treatment for Their Children Based upon Their Sincere
Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONSr. J. 123, 160 (1993) ("[T]he life of a child is
paramount and necessarily trumps all other rights.").
131 See Massie, supra note 10, at 775.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment.132 Although these scholars' argu-
ments are carefully constructed and ably presented, the arguments ul-
timately are not convincing.
A. Professor Massie's Establishment Clause Challenge
In a 1994 article, Professor Ann MacLean Massie contends that
statutes exempting spiritual healing believers from child abuse pro-
scriptions and other legal obligations violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.133 Profes-
sor Massie writes that such statutes amount to an unconstitutional "en-
dorsement of the adults' religious practices."' 34  According to
Professor Massie, these statutes "impermissibly allow parents to im-
pose their own religious beliefs and practices upon their minor
children."13 5
The Court never has endorsed a categorical rule that all statutory
religious exemptions violate the Establishment Clause. Admittedly,
the Justices have invalidated some statutory religious exemptions on
Establishment Clause grounds.' 36 But in a number of statutory ex-
emption cases, the Court has rejected Establishment Clause attacks.
As Professor Massie recognizes, 3 7 the Court has upheld laws that ex-
empted churches from property taxes,138 that exempted religious em-
ployers from a federal employment discrimination mandate,"', and
that excused conscientious objectors from compulsory military ser-
vice. 140 And in Smith,14 ' the Court approved of leaving religious ac-
132 See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1326-27, 1463-65.
133 See Massie, supra note 10, at 775. The First Amendment prohibits any law "re-
specting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
134 Massie, supra note 10, at 775.
135 Id. at 731.
136 See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 25 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(invalidating a Texas ordinance that exempted religious books and periodicals from a
state sales and use tax); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708-11
(1985) (invalidating a Connecticut statute that prohibited an employer from requir-
ing that employees must work on their Sabbath).
137 See Massie, supra note 10, at 761.
138 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (upholding a state statute
which exempted property used for religious purposes from property taxes).
139 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (up-
holding a federal statute that exempted religious employers from a federal law
prohibiting religious discrimination in employment).
140 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338-44 (1970) (plurality opinion)
(upholding a federal statute that exempted conscientious objectors from compulsory
military service).
141 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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commodation "to the political process,"1 42 favorably citing state
statutes that exempted religious believers from peyote proscrip-
tionfls. 4 3
Although some commentators have advocated Establishment
Clause interpretations that would proscribe all statutory exemp-
tions,'4 such interpretations are difficult to square with historical evi-
dence. In the late eighteenth century, American legislators were quite
willing to adopt statutory exemptions. For example, the Continental
Congress exempted religious objectors from compulsory military ser-
vice.145 Early state legislatures also enacted religious exemptions from
testimonial oaths and from state-collected religious assessments.1 4G
To the extent that they consider historical evidence relevant, oppo-
nents of statutory religious exemptions would need to argue that the
lawmakers who enacted these exemption statutes wished to proscribe
the very same exemptions when they adopted the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. No historical evidence supports this
conclusion.
Professor Massie does not seem to believe that all statutory ex-
emptions violate the Establishment Clause.1 47 Professor Massie also
acknowledges that "parents have the right to inculcate their own relig-
ious views in their children." 48 However, Professor Massie opposes
statutory exemptions for parents who treat their children through
spiritual healing, because the parents' "religious practices . . . may
have extremely debilitating effects upon their [children's] lives and
health that cannot be undone or overcome when the children reach
maturity and can make their own religious choices." 149
Professor Massie's argument reveals her antipathy toward believ-
ers who practice spiritual healing. In contexts other than spiritual
142 Id. at 890.
143 See id.
144 See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CH.
L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1961) (arguing that the Religion Clauses prohibit any government
"classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden");
Mark Tushnet, 'Of Church and State and the Supreme Court":• Kurland Retted, 1989 Sup.
CT. REV. 373, 400-02 (endorsing Professor Kurland's approach); see also Lupu, supra
note 20, at 600-09 (arguing that courts should be able to mandate religious exemp-
tions, but that legislatures usually should not be able to adopt statutory religious
exemptions).
145 See 2JouRNAs OF THE CONTNEHEAL CONcRESS 1774-1789, at 189 (Worthing-
ton C. Ford ed., 1905).
146 See McConnell, supra note 69, at 1467-71.
147 See Massie, supra note 10, at 747-60.
148 Id. at 770.
149 Id. at 752.
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healing, a parent's decisions about religious upbringing may have per-
manent, and sometimes adverse, effects on their children's welfare.
As discussed above, °5 0 when the Supreme Court allowed Amish par-
ents to withdraw their children from high school in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,15' the parents' decisions largely foreclosed any possibility that
their children could succeed outside of the Amish community.
1
'
5 2 Pa-
rental decisions that children should participate in religious fasting,
should attend religious services, and should attend religious schools
all are likely to have permanent effects on the children. Sometimes
these parental decisions may have detrimental consequences.
Professor Massie apparently would accept familiar religious
choices exercised by a parent, but would reject a parent's choice of
spiritual healing. Professor Massie thus appears to believe that the
State should not be able to accommodate spiritual healing believers,
because they practice a "bad" religion. 15 3 However, the Supreme
Court repeatedly has written that the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment prevent the State from making precisely these sorts of
judgments about religious practices. 54
Ultimately, one must remember that the First Amendment does
not prohibit religious accommodation, but proscribes only the "estab-
lishment of religion." 55 Spiritual healing practitioners are a
profound minority in our society.156 A state statute that exempts this
150 See supra text accompanying notes 32-47.
151 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
152 Professor Massie recognizes the effect of the Amish parents' decision in Yoder.
See Massie, supra note 10, at 769-71.
153 See id. at 770 ("The effect of the spiritual treatment exceptions... is to enable
parents to force harmful religious practices upon their children.").
154 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 542 (1993) (holding that city ordinances that proscribed the ritual sacrifice of
animals violated the Free Exercise Clause, because the ordinances were intended "to
target animal sacrifice by Santeria worshippers because of its religious motivation");
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 (1982) (holding that a Minnesota statute that
required some churches to report contributions violated the Establishment Clause,
because the law "was drafted with the explicit intention of including particular relig-
ious denominations and excluding others"); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 621-29
(1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that under the Free Exercise Clause, Tennessee
could not prohibit any ordained minister from serving either in the state legislature
or as a delegate at a state constitutional convention).
155 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
156 The Christian Science Church is the largest spritual healing denomination in
the United States. The Church does not release membership statistics. However, esti-
mates suggest that the Christian Science Church has between 100,000 and 170,000
members who reside in the United States. See Avram Goldstein, Faith and Medicare
Funding: Payments to Christian Science Nursing Centers underAttack, WAsH. POST, Mar. 22,
CHILDREN AND SPIRITUAL HEALING
small group of believers from child welfare laws or criminal proscrip-
tions simply does not "establish" faith healing as a state sanctioned
religion.157
B. Professor Dwyer's Equal Protection Clause Challenge
In a 1996 article, Professor James G. Dwyer presents a creative
argument that spiritual healing exemptions violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.158 At first glance, Professor Dwyer's argument seems
intuitively plausible. By exempting parents who rely on spiritual heal-
ing from child welfare laws or criminal proscriptions, state statutes
treat households that practice spiritual healing differently from other
households. But on closer inspection, Professor Dwyer's Equal Protec-
tion Clause argument is highly problematic and ultimately
unconvincing.
First, cases where a parent relies on spiritual healing typically do
not involve the state action necessary for a Fourteenth Amendment
case. 59 Without question, state spiritual healing exemptions would
involve state action if such statutes barred parents who practiced spiri-
tual healing from access to conventional medical treatment. How-
ever, state spiritual healing exemptions include no such prohibitions.
Instead, these statutes allow believers to treat their children either
through spiritual healing or through conventional medical care.
Rather than involving state action, these spiritual healing exemp-
tions appear to involve state acquiescence in private conduct. Such
state acquiescence does not satisfy the state action requirement. For
example, where a State enacted a statute that authorized a purely pri-
vate sale of a debtor's goods, the United States Supreme Court held
that the statute involved "mere acquiescence in a private action" that
1999, at Al. In contrast, more than fifty million Catholics live in the United States.
geeJ. GORDON MELTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AimcAN REClONs 209 (5th ed. 1996)
'noting that in 1989, about fifty-seven million Catholics lived in the United States).
157 See also David E. Steinberg, Religious Exempions as AJfirmative Adion, 40 E. %ol,
j. 77, 115 (1991) (asserting that members of small religious groups need protection
rough religious exemptions); cf Bd. of Educ. of Kir)as Joel Vll. Sch. Dist. v.
'rumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732 (1994) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (arguing that when the State
FNew York carved out a separate school district for a village populated entirely by an
irthodoxJewish sect, the State did not establish this religion).
.58 See Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1326-28.
59 But cf. id at 1366-84 (arguing that where a state statute provides a spiritual
taling exemption, the statute satisfies the state action requirement).
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did not amount to state action. 160 Therefore, the plaintiff could not
challenge the statute under the Equal Protection Clause.-1
Even if a plaintiff could satisfy the state action requirement,
courts are unlikely to find an Equal Protection Clause violation unless
a statutory classification burdens a suspect class. The Supreme Court
never has held that children are a suspect class. 162 And members of
religions that practice spiritual healing probably also are not a suspect
class. Typically, members of a suspect class are excluded from the po-
litical process. 163 But the decisions by state legislators to enact spiri-
tual healing exemptions indicate that elected officials are sensitive to
the needs of spiritual healing believers.
However, Professor Dwyer defines the suspect class not as all spiri-
tual healing practitioners, but rather as "children of religious objec-
tors." 164 At this point, Professor Dwyer reveals a critical assumption
that he relies on throughout his article. Specifically, Professor Dwyer
asserts that the interests of parents who practice spiritual healing and
the interests of their children inherently are in conflict, regardless of
what the parents or children themselves say about the matter. 16 5 Pro-
fessor Dwyer writes that not only are the children raised by spiritual
healing believers unable to participate in the political process, but
also "the persons who ordinarily would indirectly represent their tem-
poral interests in the public sphere-their parents-cannot be ex-
pected to do so in this specific context."1 66 Professor Dwyer continues
that parents who practice spiritual healing "can be expected to oppose
their [children's] temporal interests in the political process in con-
160 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978).
161 See id. at 164-66; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175
(1972) (holding an African-American plaintiff could not succeed in an Equal Protec.
don Clause action brought against a discriminatory private club that had obtained a
state liquor license inasmuch as the plaintiff could not establish state action, because
"the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board plays absolutely no part in establishing or
enforcing the membership or guest policies of the club that it licenses to serve
liquor").
162 See Massie, supra note 10, at 731 ("[C~hildren have never been defined as i
suspect class requiring heightened scrutiny under [the] equal protection doctrine.").
163 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(noting that suspect classes usually are "relegated to . . . a position of politica
powerlessness"); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938
(noting that prejudice against discreet and insular minorities seriously may "curtal
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protec
minorities").
164 Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1390.
165 See id. at 1406.
166 Id.
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nection with those child welfare and education laws to which [the par-
ents] have a religious objection."167
The problematic nature of Professor Dwyer's asserted conflict be-
tween the interests of spiritual healing parents and the interests of
their children becomes apparent near the end of Professor Dwyer's
article, when he discusses who might bring a constitutional challenge
to a state statute that allowed parents to treat their children through
spiritual healing.168 The State would not bring a constitutional chal-
lenge to one of its own statutes.'6 9 Parents relying on a spiritual heal-
ing exemption certainly would not seek to have the statute declared
unconstitutional. 170 And Professor Dwyer acknowledges that, where
children in a spiritual healing household are old enough to under-
stand an Equal Protection challenge to spiritual healing statutes,' 7 '
these children "would in fact be likely to express opposition to the claim
if asked, at least after their parents had a chance to discuss the matter
with them." 7 2 Unlike the typical Equal Protection suit where a bur-
dened minority group challenges a statutory classification, none of the
affected parties apparently wish to challenge the spiritual healing
exemptions.' 73
Undeterred, Professor Dwyer argues that courts should appoint a
child advocate as a "next friend" to challenge spiritual healing exemp-
tions on behalf of the affected children. 174 The fact that the children
themselves would oppose the constitutional challenge purportedly
brought on their behalf is inconsequential to Professor Dwyer, be-
cause he assumes that children in spiritual healing households often
will be "insufficiently mature minors-even those in their teens."
175
In fact, Professor Dwyer recommends that the court-appointed repre-
sentative should "stipulate at the outset that the children would op-
pose the appointment and the proposed litigation on their behalf if
asked."'176
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1465-74.
169 See id. at 1465 (explaining why a state "presumably would not support a consti-
tutional challenge to its own statutes").
170 See id. (asserting that parents who believed in spiritual healing "would certainly
oppose abolition of a statutory exemption that they presently enjoy").
171 In some cases, the affected children would be too young to understand the
differences between conventional medical care and spiritual healing. Se id.
172 Id.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 1466.
175 Id- at 1473.
176 Id.
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When Professor Dwyer advocates the appointment of a next
friend to prosecute litigation on behalf of children who do not want
to bring suit, the radical nature of Professor Dwyer's proposal be-
comes evident. Professor Dwyer would not trust the welfare of chil-
dren in spiritual healing households either to the State-which
allowed parents to choose spiritual healing-to the children's parents,
or even to the children themselves. Instead, Professor Dwyer believes
that the individuals best situated to protect the welfare of these chil-
dren would be an appointed child advocate and a judge-both of
whom presumably would share Professor Dwyer's antipathy toward
spiritual healing. Professor Dwyer's approach conflicts with the long-
standing traditions of state regulation of families, parental autonomy,
and religious toleration.
Professor Dwyer's approach also would lead to the radical result
that, whenever the State treats various children differently, the State
may face an Equal Protection Clause challenge. Consider the follow-
ing example. Billy Pilgrim and Valencia Merble are married. Billy
and Valencia live in the State of Ilium with their teenage daughter,
Barbara Pilgrim. 77
Billy and Valencia both want Barbara to attend a single-sex, Cath-
olic, parochial high school in Ilium, rather than the co-ed, public high
school. Barbara also wants to attend the Catholic school. As man-
dated by the United States Constitution, an Ilium state statute permits
parents to send their children to private schools. 178
According to Professor Dwyer's approach, the state statute that
allows Billy and Valencia to send their child Barbara to a private relig-
ious school constitutes state action. Barbara presumably will receive
somewhat different instruction at the parochial school than other
neighborhood children will receive in public schools. Therefore, a
court should appoint a child advocate, who will bring an Equal Protec-
tion Clause challenge against the statute that allows Billy and Valencia
to opt out of the public school system. The fact that Billy and Valen-
cia believe that Barbara's best interests would be served if she at-
tended the parochial school is irrelevant, because their interests are
inevitably opposed to the interests of their daughter. Nor should a
court pay any attention to Barbara's desires, because Barbara is not
sufficiently mature to make an informed choice about the school that
she should attend.
177 I have borrowed these names from Kurt Vonnegut's classic novel, Slaughler.
house Five KURT VONNEGUT, JR., SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE 23-25, 107 (1969).
178 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) (invalidating an Ore-
gon statute that did not allow parents to educate their children in private schools).
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Whether Professor Dwyer actually would favor such an Equal Pro-
tection Clause challenge to parochial school attendance is unclear.
Professor Dwyer would find an Equal Protection Clause violation
where state statutes exempt religious schools from laws that prohibit
gender discrimination and thus permit "[s]exist teaching"' 79 at Fun-
damentalist Christian and OrthodoxJewish schools. Professor Dwyer
contrasts these fundamentalists schools with private Catholic schools,
which are "much more mainstream in their orientation than funda-
mentalist Christian schools that have fought vehemently against state
regulation in recent years."180
Ultimately, like Professor Massie's Establishment Clause chal-
lenge, Professor Dwyer's Equal Protection Clause challenge is pre-
mised on an antipathy toward spiritual healing. For Professor Dwyer,
it is irrelevant that the State has permitted parents to choose spiritual
healing, that parents freely have chosen to treat their children with
spiritual healing, and that the children themselves agree with their
parents' choice. A court should preempt the decision of the parents
and their children, because spiritual healing simply is a bad choice. 18 '
CONCLUSION
A parent's decision to treat their children with spiritual healing is
supported by the religious choice principle and the parental auton-
omy principle. This Essay asserts that a State should disrupt such a
parental choice only where a parent's refusal to seek conventional
medical care threatens a child with serious physical harm or illness.
Further, I have argued that the State should intervene only if conven-
tional medical treatment offers a fair probability of substantially im-
proving a child's health. Finally, I have addressed and ultimately
rejected two sophisticated constitutional arguments, which would in-
validate statutory exemptions permitting parents to treat their chil-
dren with spiritual healing.
For believers in conventional medical science, a parent's decision
to treat his child through spiritual healing may appear unenlightened
and even cruel. However, the United States has refused to mandate
179 Dwyer, supra note 6, at 1344-45.
180 Id. at 1459-60.
181 Professor Dwyer's antipathy toward spiritual healing emerges throughout his
article. See id. at 1395 (noting that spiritual healing households "visit suffering on
children based on their parents' 'pieties'"); id. at 1443 (asserting that research dem-
onstrates that an upbringing in a conservative, authoritarian, religious household
"retards development"); i&e at 1477 (describing the purpose of spiritual healing ex-
emptions as "a naked preference for the interests of parents over the interests of
children").
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that citizens must submit to a prescribed orthodoxy. Instead, our na-
tion has followed a tradition of religious toleration, where the major-
ity has respected a variety of divergent religious choices. Cases
involving children and spiritual healing may involve the greatest chal-
lenge to this tradition.
